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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY LINES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
NO. 8654 
Plaintiff has seen fit to limit its Satement of Facts 
substantially to the allegations in its complaint. There 
is no attempt whatever to state the facts appearing in 
defendant's answer, which are also deemed admitted 
in this proceeding. We believe it essential to a proper 
approach to the issues here involved to state the facts 
revealed by the answer. 
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2 
Prior to April 25, 1944, the Utah Light and Traction 
Company held a franchise to operate electric street cars 
and trolley buses over certain streets in Salt Lake City. 
On that date the traction company and plaintiff peti-
tioned the city to approve the transfer of the franchise 
to plaintiff. An ordinance was adopted approving the 
transfer. It provided that plaintiff had the right to 
operate "a comprehensive transportation system upon 
and over the streets of Salt Lake City, including electric 
car.s, electric trolley coaches and rnotor buses." It further 
provided for the payment annually of "a license tax of 
1f2 of 1% of the gross passenger revenue derived from 
operations within the City of electric street cars, trolley 
coaches and motor buses." The franchise so granted was 
to run until July 1, 1955 and was aceepted by the plain-
tiff. 
The plaintiff, since 1947, ha.s operated only motor 
buses, but it continued to pay the license tax above re-
ferred to until the ordinance was adopted February 27, 
1951, the one now under attack. At no time did plaintiff 
contend that the franchise so granted was unnecessary 
or became inoper.ative because it was operating only 
motor buses, nor did it request cancellation. It did not 
pay the license tax under protest, nor did it ever assert 
that the license tax was not uniform or that it was dis-
criminatory. We shall refer to the charge of a percentage 
of the gross revenue as .a license tax for simplification 
without attempting to define it as such a tax. 
When the ordinance of February 27, 1951 was adop-
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ted, the plaintiff, through its proper officers, orally 
consented and agreed to its passage and agreed to in-
creasing the license tax from ¥2 of 1% to 2i% of the 
gross revenue. This was agreed to and the ordinance 
passed more than 4 years before the expiration date of 
the 1944 franchise then in effect. 
Plaintiff never at any time questioned the validity 
of the 1951 ordinance or the tax so increased until this 
.action was brought in 1956. On the contrary, plaintiff 
has in all re.spects complied with the ordinance. It has 
filed with the City Treasurer quarterly reports of gross 
revenues, together with a computation of the tax to be 
paid, and co-incidental therewith has paid, without pro-
test, and without questioning the validity of the tax, 
the .amount of the tax thus computed, and plaintiff has 
permitted access to its records for verification, all as 
provided for in the ordinance now attacked. 
Under date of February 27, 1956, plaintiff petitioned 
the governing body of Salt Lake City for a hearing 
to discuss the matter of eliminating the license tax. A 
he.aring was held and a new ordinance was passed amend-
ing the 1951 franchise by reducing the license tax from 
2% to 1% for the year 1956. A copy of this amending 
ordinance is attached to the Answer. Neither in its pe-
tition, nor in the hearing thereon, did plaintiff assert 
that the 1951 ordinance was void or that the license 
tax imposed thereby was invalid. Instead, plaintiff in 
writing expressed appreciation to the City governing 
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4 
body for making the reduction, and plaintiff paid the 
1% license tax for 1956 without protest or any claim 
that either the original or amendatory ordinance ~r 
license tax was invalid. 
Under date of July 15, 1953, plaintiff filed with the 
Public Service Commis.sion of Utah an application to 
increase its fares. In such application it listed as an 
item of expense, to show its need for increasing fares, 
the license tax payable under the 1951 ordinance. At 
the hearing on March 10, 1954, this item was discussed 
and the Commission made inquiry from the City's Mayor 
whether the City would forego this license tax, stating 
that it was one of the elements of cost shown in the 
tran.sportation company's operating cost. The City de-
clined to forego and on :Jiarch 17, 1954 the plaintiff 
was granted increases in its fares. In its decision the 
Civil Service Commission refers to the 2% tax and to 
wage increases as elen1ents in the expense figure. Plain-
tiff did not contend before the Public Service Commis-
sion that said tax was invalid, but, on the contrary, 
relied upon such tax .as an iten1 of expense it was bound 
to pay in justification for its application for a raise in 
fares. 
lTnder the 1951 ordinance, plaintiff is authorized 
to operate double or single trark lines for electric street 
raihvay, double or single trolley coach lines, n1otor bus0s 
or any other ,systein of n1.ass transportation, all as it 
may deter1nine. Consequently, it is free to use whatever 
type of 1nass transportation it desires under this fran~ 
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5 
chise. 
1The City has never regarded the franchise void 
because of plaintiff's failure to accept it in writing, but 
has a~ways insisted that the license tax thereunder 'Je 
paid, except when it voluntarily eliminated % in 1956. 
The city imposes a license fee upon automobiles, taxi-
cabs, auto stages, trucks and other vehicles used for 
business upon the streets of Salt Lake City but has not 
required such license fee from plaintiff, and plaintiff 
has been exempted from all taxes other than the 2% 
license tax. By the express language of the ordinance 
that tax is in lieu of all other taxes that the City might 
impose. 
Based upon the foregoing the City alleges that plain-
tiff has waived all objections to the validity of the ordin-
ance and to the necessity of filing an acceptance thereof 
and is estopped to claim said ordinance void and to rely 
on its own wrong and failure in failing to give written 
acceptance of the ordinance, while, nevertheless, pro-
ceeding with its mass transportation business under the 
ordinance the same as if it had filed formal written 
acceptance of said ordinance. 
STATEJ\1:ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE F AlLURE OF PLAINTIFF TO FILE WRITTEN 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY 27, 
1951, DID NOT RENDER IT NULL AND VOID. 
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6 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ALL OBJECTIONS TO 
THE VALIDITY OF SAID ORDINANCE AND IS BOUND 
BY ITS TERMS AND IS ESTOPPED TO QUESTION ITS 
VALIDITY. 
POINT III 
BY IMPOSING THE LICENSE TAX UPON PLAINTIFF 
BUT NOT UPON OTHER TYPES OF MOTOR CONVEY-
ANCES THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND LACK OF UNIFORMITY 
IN RESPECT TO CLASS AS CONTENDED BY PLAINTIFF. 
POINT IV 
SALT LAKE CITY HAS POWER TO LEVY THE FRAN-
CHISE TAX IMPOSED BY SAID ORDINANCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE F AlLURE OF PLAINTIFF TO FILE WRITTEN 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY 27, 
1951, DID NOT RENDER IT NULL AND VOID. 
Plaintiff is attempting to convert its failure to file 
a written consent to the ordinance of February 27, 1951, 
as the equivalent of a refusal to giYe such consent. No-
where is there any inkling that a refusal to accept was 
ever transmitted to the City, or that the City ever re-
g.arded such failure as the equivalent, or that the plain-
tiff ever regarded such failure as the equivalent, of a 
refusal to accept. On the contrary both parties proceeded 
at all times under the theory that the ordinance was 
valid and that both were controlled in their relationship 
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7 
with each other by the terms thereof. The reports re-
quired by the ordinance were made, the gross receipts 
given, the tax calculated and paid, and the books and 
records of the plaintiff were open to the City for check-
ing, all as required by the terms of the ordinance, for 
six ye.ar.s before this action was commenced. Further-
more, as alleged in the answer, and admitted by plain-
tiff, plaintiff's officers consented and agreed, orally, 
to the passage of this very ordinance and to the increase 
in the license tax from ¥2 of 1% to 2% of the gross 
revenue .as contained in said ordinance. The franchise, 
being in the nature of a contract, there would be some 
doubt as to the power of the City to change its terms 
without the consent of the plaintiff. So to remove this 
doubt the matter was discussed with plaintiff's officers. 
In these discussions plaintiff never did que.stion the 
validity of the license tax, but orally agreed to the in-
crease, thus clearing the way for the change. In addi-
tion, for five years, plaintiff complied with the terms 
of the ordinance and then petitioned for a reduction in 
the tax for 1956. It expressed gratitude for such con-
cession. It is apparent, therefore, that there was never 
any refusal to accept the ordinance; that the lack of 
a written acceptance was merely an oversight. To now 
assert that such lack of written acceptance arose from 
a refusal to .accept is an attempt now to create, after 
the fact, something that had no actuality at the time 
the ordinance was passed or during the 6 years since 
its passage before this suit was commenced and is wholly 
contrary to the attitude manifested by the plaintiff 
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8 
through its complete compliance with the terms of the 
ordinance. 
The authorities generally hold that a formal written 
acceptance of the franchise ordinance, even though it 
contains a provision that it shall be null and void with-
out such .acceptance, is not necessary; that the City may 
waive the written acceptance and acceptance may result 
from the practical use of the franchise. 
12 McQuillan Municipal Corp. Sec. 34.43, Page 150: 
"Sometimes, however, an ordinance granting 
a franchise requires the grantee to file his accep-
tance thereof. But where the grant of a franchise 
requires an acceptance in writing, the munici-
pality may waive .such acceptance, and the act 
of the company in using the streets may be suffi-
cient as an acceptance." 
Postal Tel. Cable Co. vs. City of Newport, 76 S.W. 
159, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 635. 
Here the ordinance required acceptance in wTiting 
within 30 days or the same should be null and void .and 
of no effect. The plaintiff refused to pay the license 
tax claiming it had not accepted the franchise and was 
operating under the federal statute governing post roads. 
The court .s.ays: 
"The defendant entered on the streets soon 
after the ordinance was passed and constructed 
its system. It had no authority to do so, except 
under the ordinance. Its acceptruwe was an ac-
ceptance of the ordinance in the .absence of some 
expre.ssed disclain1er, which is not alleged. Its 
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9 
failure to accept the ordinance in writing might 
be waived by the city, and this waiver is implied 
from its acquiescence in the defendant's acts. 
"If the defendant was not satisfied with the 
terms of the gr.ant it could have refused to ac-
cept it .... The defendant in going ahead under 
the ordinance also took its chance, and it cannot 
be heard to say now that the charge was too high." 
Postal Tel. Cable Co. vs. City of Newport, 169 S.W. 
700. 
The same issue was involved here as in the next 
preceding case. The case was appealed to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Postal Tel. Cable Co. vs. 
City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 62 Law Ed. 1215, where 
the court said : 
"We assume if the first New York company 
did at the outset accept the ordinance, either 
in writing, according to its terms, or by erecting 
poles and wires and occupying the streets there-
under, or in any other manner satisf.actory to 
the city, that company and its successors in the 
ownership of the telegraph system, including de-
fendant, are bound to comply with the terms of 
the ordinance as to the special license tax so long 
as they continue to retain and enjoy the privileges 
conferred." 
City R Co. vs. Citizens Street R Co., 166 U.S. 557. 
41 L. ed. 1114: 
"This ordinance is also attacked upon the 
ground that it was never formally accepted by 
the company. There is really nothing in this con-
tention. No formal resolution of the acceptance 
is necessary in any case, if the facts show an 
actual, pr.actical acceptance by the company, or 
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10 
action which would be only explicable in case 
the amendment were accepted. There are two cir-
cumstances in this case, either of which is suffi-
cient to constitute an acceptance. 
"Mr. Johnson, the manager of the road, who 
desired the extension of the charter, applied for 
an amendment making the original section 15 
read forty five years instead of thirty years and 
in that connection says: 'After a good deal of 
argument I was finally forced to concede to the 
wishes of the committee, and they recommended 
to the council an ordinance making it read 'thirty 
seven years,' instead of the 'forty-five' we ap-
plied for. This ordinance was consented to in com-
mittee, and afterwards agreed to with the council, 
as the best we could do under the circumstances.' 
This was sufficient, as it is universally held that 
a previous request for an ordinance obviates the 
necessity of a subsequent acceptance. Atlanta vs. 
Gate City Gaslight Co. 71 Ga. 106; Illinois River 
R. Co. vs. Zimmer, 20 ill. 65-1: Lincoln & K Bank 
vs. Richardson, 1 ~Ie. 79 (10 Am. Dec. 34) State, 
Carlton, vs. Dawson, 22 Ind. 272; X ewton Ys. 
Carbery~ 5 Cranch, C. C. 632; Perkins vs. San-
ders, 56 :Miss. 732, 739: 1 ~Iorawetz, Priv. Corp. 
Sec. 23. 
·· \V e are also of opinion that an acceptance 
may be presumed fron1 the fact that the ainend-
ment was beneficial to the corporation." 
The authorities also hold, .as stated in 6 JlcQuillan 
M1tnicipal Corporations, Sec. 20.12, Page 27: 
"One who accepts .an ordinance and treats 
it as in force for a period of years n1ay, under 
the circu1nstances, be precluded fron1 challenging 
its validity." 
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This is true even though the license granted was 
ultra vires, though not against public policy. In support 
of this proposition, we cite the following: 
Chicago Gen. Ry. Co. vs. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 
253, 52 N.E. 880. 
A suit to collect a mileage tax imposed by the fran-
chise ordinance. The court says: 
"'V e are also of the opinion that, even though 
it might be held that the condition upon which 
the permit or license was granted to the defend-
ant railway company was ultra vires, the city not 
having the power to impose it, nevertheless, the 
ordinance having been accepted by the company 
with the condition attached, agreeing thereby to 
perform it, it became a valid contract between it 
and the city, the validity of which the defendant 
is now estopped to deny. The act of the city in 
imposing. the condition cannot be treated as 
against public policy or prohibited by statute, 
and void, and therefore, having accepted the con-
tract in its entirety and enjoyed the benefits for 
which it agreed to pay the amount prescribed, it 
cannot now repudiate that contract. Kadish vs. 
Association, 151 Ill. 531, 38 N.E. 236; Cook Co. vs. 
City of Chicago, 158 Ill. 524, 42 N.E. 67; City 
of Fulton vs. Northern Illinois College, 158 Ill., 
333, 42 N .E. 138." 
City of Springfield vs. Central Union Tel. Co. 184 
Ill. App. 400. 
The court says: 
"The ordinance having been accepted, neither 
the grantees nor their assigns may be permitted 
to repudiate any of the terms and conditions that 
are not contrary to public policy or prohibited 
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12 
by statute. Having accepted it became a valid 
contract in its entirety." 
Brattleboro vs. Town of Brattleboro, 173 A. 209, 
................ Vt ................. . 
The court says: 
"One who accepts an unconstitutional legis-
lative enactment and treats it as in force for 
years cannot be heard to question its validity. 
Nor can he challenge such enactment on the 
ground that it is discriminatory." 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ALL OBJECTIONS TO 
THE VALIDITY OF SAID ORDINANCE AND IS BOUND 
BY ITS TERMS AND I.S ESTOPPED TO QUESTION ITS 
VALIDITY. 
The facts as contained in the answer and admitted 
by plaintiff clearly show that plaintiff has always re-
garded the ordinance as valid and binding in all its 
terms. It has complied with and performed all its terms. 
It has filed with the City Treasurer quarterly reports 
of gross revenue, together with a computation of the 
tax to be paid. It has permitted the city to verify such 
reports by giving .access to its books. It has petitioned 
and accepted a modification of the terms of the fran-
chise ordinance. It has reported to the Public Service 
Commission that it was bound to pay the license tax 
and included that license tax as an item of expense in 
justification for a raise in its fares. The Public Ser-
vice Commission, at plaintiff's instance, considered the 
tax as a legal and recurring expense and granted a 
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13 
raise in fares based upon such expense, which raise is 
still in effect. The people of Salt Lake City have been 
paying these increased fares since 1farch 17, 1954 and 
will continue to pay them indefinitely in the future. 
By plaintiff's own acts and actions the people of this 
City have been, .and now are, paying these taxes through 
the medium of paying increased fares. The officers of 
the plaintiff agreed orally to the increase in the license 
tax from lj2 of 1% to 2%, and upon such agreement 
the ordinance was adopted, notwithstanding the ordin-
ance then in force still had four years to run. The plain-
tiff has been operating motor buses exclusively sinee 
1947, but has, nevertheless, complied with the terms of 
the original ordinance and the ordinance of 1951 and 
has never at any time asserted that the change to motor 
transportation or otherwise worked an avoidance of the 
franchise or authorized it to operate without a fran-
chise. 
As stated in Salt Lake City vs. Utah Light and 
Traction Company, 52 Ut. 210, 153 P. 556: 
"Where the controversy has arisen between 
the contracting parties merely, and in ordinary 
actions and procedings, the courts have usually 
cornpelled compliance with the ordinance treating 
them as contracts." 
Under the conception that this ordinance is a con-
tract which it in legal effect is, it is inconceivable that 
the plaintiff can now successfully assert, in the face of 
the facts above stated, that it has not waived the mere 
formality of filing a written acceptance of the ordinance, 
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and is not estopped to deny that it has entered into a 
contract with Salt Lake City governing its right to use 
the city streets for the prosecution of its business. As 
stated by the court in the case of Chicago General Rail-
way Company vs. City of Chicago, supra. 
"The ordinance having been accepted by the 
company with the condition attached, agreeing 
thereby to perform it, it became a valid contract 
between it and the city, the validity of which 
the defendant is estopped to deny." 
The authorities cited by plaintiff do not involve con-
tracts between the parties involved and the city by the 
terms of which the parties agreed to pay the city a 
license tax and so are not in point. 
POINT III 
BY IMPOSING THE LICENSE TAX UPON PLAINTIFF 
BUT NOT UPON OTHER TYPES OF MOTOR CONVEY-
ANCES THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND LACK OF UNIFORMITY 
IN RESPECT TO CLASS AS CONTENDED BY PLAINTIFF. 
The rule is stated in 7 5 A.L.R. Page 26 as follows: 
"With one exception, hereinafter noted ("'\\:ei-
mar Stor.age Co. vs. Dill (1928) 103 N.J. Eq. 307, 
143 A tl. 438, infra), the courts which have passed 
upon the question have uniformly held that motor 
busses or jitneys operating as common carriers 
of passengers between fixed tennini or over reg-
ular routes are the proper subject of a separate 
classification, and that a state 1nay, without deny-
ing the equal protection of the laws, subject such 
motor busses or jitneys to a tax, and exempt 
therefrom all other kinds of motor carriers." 
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We refer the court to the cases there cited and quoted 
from. Typical of the views expressed by the courts is 
the following from Allan vs. Bellingham 95 Wash. 12, 
163 P. 18, involving an ordinance which defines .a jitney 
bus to mean and include "every motor propelled vehicle 
not operated on tracks, used in the occupation of carry-
ing persons for hire, operating on any street for the 
purpo.se of affording a means of transportation along 
any street similar to that afforded by street railways, 
by indiscriminately accepting and discharging within 
the limits of the city such persons as may offer them-
selves for transportation for hire along the ways or 
cours~s on which such vehicle is used or operated, or 
may be running." 
The court says: 
"The record does not disclose the character 
of the business conducted by the other kinds of 
common carriers enumerated by the appellant, 
and, of course, the court has only such knowledge 
of the matter as is possessed by the generality 
of mankind. In so far as we are advised, we think 
there is a wide distinction between the class of 
business done by jitney busses and that done by 
the other carriers named. Street cars are so far 
distinct as to be in a class by themselves, and 
any regulation applicable to a jitney bus could 
hardly be applicable to their situation. Auto stages 
operate on regular schedules between fixed points, 
usually between one city or town and another. 
Auto busses and horse carriages ordinarily carry 
passengers between given points, usually to and 
from depots, docks or other landings, and hotels. 
Sightseeing automobiles are operated more in the 
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nature of private conveyances than as public car-
riers, and their business bears no relation to the 
busines.s of a jitney bus. Taxicabs, livery rigs, 
and the like operate from fixed stands and are 
put into use on hire. The jitney bus differs from 
each of these. It is operated continuously upon 
the streets, usually in the most congested parts, 
soliciting and taking up passengers wherever they 
can be found. It is never for hire at all; all that 
is offered is a seat and an opportunity to ride 
to some point within the limit of its operations. 
Its unrestricted use is fraught with danger, not 
only to the passenger it carries, but to others 
using the streets for their own purposes. Being 
a common carrier, it is a subject of regulation, 
and we are constrained to believe that its busi-
ness is such as to make it subject of separate 
classification. This being true, the city council 
of a municipality may lawfully exact regulations 
applicable to its business which it does not make 
applicable to the business of other common car-
riers, without violating either of the constitutional 
provisions before cited. 
"::Municipal ordinances regulating the jitney 
traffic as a class apart from other cmmnon ca.!"-
riers have been enacted in many of the principal 
cities of our sister states. These, in so far as 
we are advised, have been uniformly upheld by 
the highest courts of such states against attacks 
on the ground that they violated the equal pro-
tection and due process of law clauses in the 
Federal Constitution, and the provisions directed 
against class legislation in the Constitution of the 
individual states. Some of the cases are the fol-
lowing : City of Memphis vs. State ex rei. Ryals, 
133 Tenn. 83, 179 S. ,V. 631., L.R.A. 1916B, 1151; 
Ex parte Bogle (Tex. Cr. R.) 179 S.,V. 1193; 
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Huston vs. City of Des :Moines (Iowa) 156 N.W. 
883; Ex Parte Dickey (W. Va.) 85 S.E. 781, 
L.R.A. 1915F, 840: Thielke vs. Albee, 79 Or. 48, 
153 Pac. 793; Ex parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150 
Pac. 348, L.R.A. 1915F, 850; Hazelton vs. City of 
Atlanta, 144 Ga. 775, 87 S.E. 1043; Auto Transit 
Co. vs. Forth Worth (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S.W. 
685." 
This case is referred to in Texas Co. vs. Cohn, 112 
P. 2d 522 as follows : 
"In Allen vs. Bellingham, the validity of an 
ordinance of the city of Bellingham, which placed 
a license, or occupation tax, upon the owners of 
jitney busses, was challenged. This court held that 
the ordinance did not violate the Federal or State 
Constitutions, although operators of auto stages, 
sight-seeing automobiles, taxicabs, and street cars, 
manifestly in competition with jitney busses, were 
not subject to the tax." 
Dickey vs. Davis 76 W.Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781, L.R.A. 
1915 F. 840. 
"* * * But, as regards unusual and extraordinary 
rights respecting public properties, its power of 
control and regulation is much more extensive. 
Such rights are in the nature of concessions by 
the public, wherefore the legislature may give or 
withhold them at its pleasure. It may give them 
for some purposes and withhold them for others, 
and in the case of those given, it may, upon con-
siderations of character, quality, and circum-
stances, discriminate, permitting some things of 
a general class or nature to be done and refusing 
to permit others of the same general class to be 
done, or extending the privilege to some persons 
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and denying it to others because of differences 
of character or capacity. 
"
1The right of a citizen to travel upon the 
highway and transport his property thereon in 
the ordinary course of life and business, differs 
radically and obviously from that of one who 
makes the highway his place of business and uses 
it for private gain, in the running of a stage coach 
or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary 
right of a citizen,-a common right, a right com-
mon to all; while the latter is special, unusual 
and extraordinary. As to the former, the extent o.f 
legislative power is that of regulation; but, as 
to the latter, its power is broader; the right may 
be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some 
and denied to others, because of its extraordinary 
nature. This distinction, elementary and funda-
mental in character, is recognized by all the 
authorities." 
See also 75 A.L.R. Page 30 where it is said: 
"And the fact that taxicabs are exempted 
from or not subject to a tax imposed upon jitneys 
or n1otor buses operating over regular routes or 
between fixed termini, or on a plan similar to 
that followed by street railways, does not render 
the tax unconstitutionally discriminatory, since 
the classification is a reasonable one." 
See also Prick rs. City of Gary, 135 X.E. 346, 192 
Ill. 76: .Jackie Cab Co., et a1, rs. Ch icapo Park District 
9 N.E. 2<1 213, 366 Ill. -t-7-±; Tu.fl.qlc rs. Parket·, 156 P. 
2d 533, 159 l(an. 57:2; Cent ra1 Grcylwund Lines rs. 
Greyhound Cab CorJJ. 81 N.Y.S. 2d 416: Jarrell ts. 
Orlando Transit Co., 167 So. 664, 123 Fla. 77G: Postal 
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Tel. Cable Co. rs. City of Newport, supra; State vs. 
Black Hills Trans. Co. 20 N.vV. 2d 683, -------------------- S.D. 
In Slater vs. Salt Lake City, 115 Ut. 476, 206 P. 
2d 153, 9 AL.R. 2d 712, this court stated the funda-
mental principles now under discussion as follows: 
"Discrimination is the essence of classifica-
tion and does violence to the constitution only 
when the basis upon which it is founded is :un-
reasonable. In fixing the limits of the class, the 
legislative body has a wide discretion and this 
court may not concern itself with the wisdom or 
policy of the law. Our function is to determine 
whether an enactment operated equally upon all 
persons similarly situated. If it does then the 
discrimination is within permissable legislative 
limits. If it does not, then the differentials would 
be without reasonable basis and the act does meet 
the test of constitutionality." 
As stated in Dickey vs. Davis, stttpra, that the plain-
tiff "has no natural right to maintain upon a public high-
way a vehicle for the carriage of passengers for hire is 
unquestionable." Further, it is clear that the city violates 
no rule of uniformity, or of unfair discrimination, in 
requiring of plaintiff conditions including the payment 
of the 2% of its gross revenue, for permission to use 
its streets, not required of other types of transporters 
of passengers. 
Plaintiff's buses are designed to accommodate mass 
transportation. The wear and tear on the streets by such 
vehicles making many runs per day over fixed routes 
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is heavy. By the terms of the ordinance plaintiff has the 
right to maintain coach stop signs upon the street signs 
maintained by the city. Also the city furnishes sand 
and salt for use by the plaintiff when water, snow or 
ice impairs the normal traction. Further the plaintiff 
is permitted to maintain benches on the street for the 
accommodation of its customers. Special loading and 
unloading places are provided and traffic generally is 
directed away from the same so as to not interfere with 
plaintiff's operations. These special incidents to the 
use of the streets are not afforded to the public, nor 
to other carriers of passengers. Clearly plaintiff is in 
a class which entitles the city to legislate as to it with-
out being guilty of class legislation or unfair discrimin-
ation. 
POINT IV 
SALT LAKE CITY HAS POWER TO LEVY THE FRAN-
CHISE TAX IMPOSED BY SAID ORDINANCE. 
While the statutes do not expressly grant to the 
City the power to grant a franchise for the operation 
of a mass transportation systen1 over its streets within 
its boundaries, silnilar to the transportation provided 
by a street railway s~-stem, they do giYe the city plenary 
power over its streets. Section 10-8-8, U.C.A. 1953, em-
powers the city to •'lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, 
narrow, extend, gradE>, pave or othenvise improve streets, 
alleys, avenues, boulevards .... and 1nay vacate the 
same or parts thereof by ordinance." Section 10-8-11, 
U.C.A. 1953 provides that it "1nay regulate the use of 
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streets, alleys, avenues ... " Section 10-8-39 empowers 
a city to license, tax and regulate stages and buses, 
etc. Section 10-8-80 authorizes the levying of a license 
tax or fee upon any business for revenue. 
As stated in Schoenfield vs. City of Seattle, 265 F. 
726: 
"The plaintiff purposes to utilize public 
streets of a city for a special purpose and private 
gain, .a right not common to all. As to such the 
Washington court, in Allan vs. Bellingham 
(supra) said: 'The power of the city as to such 
u.sers of the streets is entirely plenary.'" 
In Consolidated Coach Corp. vs. Kentucky River 
Coach Co., 249 Ky. 65, 60 S.W. 2d 127, the court said: 
"The streets and highways belong to the 
public. They are built and maintained at public 
expen.se for the use of the general public in the 
ordinary and customary manner. The state, and 
the city ,as an arm of the state, has absolute con-
trol of the streets in the interest of the public. 
No Private individual or corporation has a right 
to use of the streets in the prosecution of the 
business of a common carrier for private gain 
without the consent of the state, nor except upon 
the terms and conditions prescribed by the state 
or municipality, as the case may be." 
Under a statute authorizing ordinances for the gen-
eral welfare and proper government of the city the court, 
in Clem vs. LaGrange 149 S.E. 638, 169 Ga. 51, 65 A.L.R. 
1361, stated : 
"Individuals do not have the inherent right 
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to conduct their private businesses in the streets 
of a city. A city can prohibit the owners or oper-
ators of taxicabs and busses from tr.ansporting 
passengers for hire in such vehicles upon the 
streets of the city. The transportation of p~ssen­
gers for hire in such vehicles or otherwise is a 
privilege which the municipality can grant or 
withhold. As the owners or operators of taxicabs 
or jitney busses have no right to transport pas-
sengers for hire on the streets of the city, and 
as the city can prohibit wholly or partially the 
conduct of such business in its streets, if the 
city sees fit to grant permission to individuals 
to conduct such business in its streets, it can 
prescribe such terms and conditions as it may 
see fit, and individuals desiring to avail them-
selves of such permission must comply with such 
terms and conditions, whether they are reasonable 
or unreasonable. Schlesinger vs. Atlanta, 161 Ga. 
148, 129 S.E. 861." 
Payne vs. Jackson City Lines, 220 ~Iiss. 180, 70 So. 
2d 520 involved transportation b~.,. motor bus. The court 
said: 
"The streets and highways, built and main-
tained at public expense, belong to the public, and 
no private individual or corporation has a right 
to use then1 for con1n1ercial purposes for private 
gain without the consent of the state of munici-
pality involved." 
We quote the following fr01n Su!dreth vs. City of 
Charlottc, 27 S.E. 2d 650, 223 N.C. 629: 
"The business of carrying passengers for hire 
is a privilege, the licensing of which is peculiarly 
and exclusively a legislative preprogative. So is 
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the power to regulate the use of public roads and 
streets. 
"Generally, under the powers conferred upon 
them by their charters, or by general statute, 
municipal corporations may impose reasonable 
conditions upon the use of the streets by jitneys, 
taxicabs, motor busses, or other motor vehicles 
operating as common carriers in the transporta-
tion of passengers or freight. (Blashfield Auto. 
Law & Proc. Perm Ed. p. 81, Sec. 105, see note 
19 for authorities.) 
"This power exists not only under the licen-
sing authority of the municipality but also under 
its recognized power to regulate the use of its 
streets in the interest of public safety and con-
venience, and it is generally held that a munici-
pality in the exercise of this power may prohibit 
the use of the streets for private business or 
other purpose detrimental to the common good. 
3 McQuillan Mun. Corp. (2d) Revised, 216, Sec. 
989; State vs. Caster, supra; Blashfield Cyc. Auto. 
Law & Prac. Perm. Ed. Sec. 78, p. 67; City of 
New Orleans vs. Calamari, 150 La. 739, 91 So. 
172, 22 A.L.R. 106; Henderson vs. Bluefield, 98 
W. Va. 640, 127 S.E. 492, 42 A.L.R. 279, Anno. 
p. 282. 
"It was never contemplated that the high-
ways should form a part of the capital stock of 
common carriers engaged in the tran.sportation 
of persons or property for profit, or that the use 
of the highways should be donated to them for 
that purpose. 
"Clearly, these companies have no vested or 
inherent right in the highways, and their unre-
strained use thereof is equivalent to an appropri-
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ation of public property for private use, and it is 
within the power of the Legislature to prohibit 
this use or to prescribe the terms upon which i.t 
may be exercised. 
"Where the power to regulate, license and 
control motor vehicles for hire is vested by the 
Legislature in the City ·Council, there is a broad 
presumption in favor of the validity of an ordin-
ance undertaking to exercise such power, and he 
who attacks it must show affirmatively that it 
is not expressly authorized by statute or that it 
is, as applied to him, unreasonable and oppres-
sive. 
"The municipality may name such terms and 
conditions as it see.s fit to impose for the privilege 
of transacting such business, and the courts can-
not hold such terms unreasonable except for dis-
crimination between persons in a like situation." 
This court in Slater t·s. Salt Lake City, 115 Ut. 476, 
206 P. 2d 153, 9 A.L.R. 2d 712, quoted this language 
from Ex parte ~lares, 75 Cal. App 2d 798, 171 P. 2d 
762: 
" 'The place for the conduct of a private busi-
ness is upon private property; and it has been 
said that there is no vested right to do business 
upon the public streets.' Pittsford vs. City of Los 
Angeles, 50 Cal. App 2d 25, 32, 122 P 2d 535, 
538, .and .see text therein quoted and cases cited. 
'It is well established law that the highways of 
the state are public property; ... .and that their 
use for purposes of gain is special and extra-
ordinary, which, generally, at least, the legisla-
ture may prohibit or condition as it sees fit ( cita-
tions).' Stephenson vs. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 264:, 
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53 S Ct 181, 184, 77 L ed 288, 294, 87 ALR 721. 
'Use of a public street for private enterprise may 
under some circumstances rebound to the public 
good; but nevertheless it is a special privilege 
peculiarly subject to regulation, and one which 
may be granted on reasonable terms or entirely 
withheld (citations).' People vs. Galena, 24 Cal 
App Supp 2d 770,775,70 P 2d 724,727 ... Numer-
ous authorities support these statements.'" 
The court also quoted from Packard vs. Banton, 
26-l: U.S. 140, 68 L ed 596, as follows: 
"If the state determines that the use of streets 
for private purposes in the usual and ordinary 
manner shall be preferred over their use by com-
mon carriers for hire, there is nothing in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent. The streets 
belong to the public and are primarily for the 
use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use 
for the purposes of gain is special and extraor-
dinary, and, generally at least, may be prohibited 
or conditioned as the Legislature deems proper 
" 
The case of Pine Bluff vs . ..A_rkansas Traveler Bus 
Co., 171 Ark. 727, 285 S.\V. 375, stated the rule as follows: 
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the 
streets and transport his property thereon in 
the ordinary course of things is wholly different 
from that of a common carrier, who makes the 
streets his place of business and uses them for 
private gain in the running of motor busses. The 
former is the common right of everyone, and the 
latter is a special or exceptional use of the streets, 
not common to all citizens of the state." 
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We contend that under the statutes above quoted 
and the rule of law enunciated by the foregoing cases the 
city has the power to impose special terms upon all 
persons using its streets for the business of common 
carrier, and that such terms may be evidenced by and 
form a franchise ordinance adopted by the city. 
Section 54-2-1 (12) defines the term "automobile 
corporation" as including every corporation and person 
engaged in or transacting a business of transporting 
passengers by means of automobiles or motor stages on 
public streets. Subsection 14 defines a common carrier 
as including an automobile corporation. Section 54-4-25 
(1) requires every automobile corporation to obtain a 
certificate from the Public Service Commission. Sub-
section (3) provides that every applicant for such a 
certificate shall file satisfactory evidence to show that 
.such applicant has received the required consent, fran-
chise or permit of the proper county, city, municipal 
or other public authority. 
This court in Union Pacific R. Co. vs. Public Service 
Commission, 103 Ut. 186, 134 P 2d 469 refers to Section 
54-4-25 (3), and holds that a railroad could not occupy 
any streets of a eity without the consent of the city and 
that such consent was required under the Public Utilities 
Act. 
In People vs. Public Sen·ice Commission, 174 N.E. 
637, 255 N.Y. 232, the act required tl1e applicant for 
a certificate to show that it had "reeeived the required 
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consent of the proper municipal authorities." The court 
said: 
"Under this statute a consent presently oper-
ative that the petitioner occupy the highway is 
a condition precedent to a certificate of approval." 
In Sylvania Bttses vs. City of Toledo, 160 N.E. 674, 
118 Ohio St. 187, the plaintiff obtained certificates from 
the Public Utilitie.s Commission in 1923. In 1925 the 
Utilities Law was amended requiring motor transporta-
tion companies to obtain consent of the municipal cor-
poration. The City of Toledo, by ordinance, prohibited 
the transportation of passengers over routes served by 
a traction company and required a permit from the city 
to transport passengers for hire. The city threatened 
to enforce the ordinance and plaintiff sued to enjoin 
the city from interfering with the operation of its motor 
buses. The court held the certificates held by plaintiff 
did not constitute a franchise nor a contract. "A permis-
sion granted by the certificate to operate upon the public 
highways could not invest plaintiff in error with the 
right to use the public streets for his private business." 
It was only a license and could be revoked. 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Legisla-
ture, in enacting the Public Utilities Act, did not intend 
to take away any of the powers otherwise granted to 
cities to control the use of their streets. On the contrary, 
such control was specifically recognized and the Act 
made subject thereto. 
Plaintiff cites Utah Light and Traction Company vs. 
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Public Service Commission, 118 P 2d 683, 101 Utah 99 
as being conclusive that the city had no power to re-
quire a franchise of the plaintiff and to impose condi-
tions therein not applicable to other users of the streets. 
An analysis of that case shows the following: The 
Utah Light and Traction Company, which had a fran-
chise from Salt Lake City to operate a mass transpor-
tation system over the city's streets, protested before 
the Public Utilities Commission the application of "Air-
ways" for .a certificate to "render service as a common 
carrier of passengers between Salt Lake City and some 
9 smaller communities in the south end of Salt Lake 
City,'' a wholly interurban operation. The question of 
operating a bus system within Salt Lake City, Wholly 
intraurban was not involved. The Traction Company 
raised the objection that "Airways" had not .shown it 
had the consent of the county, municipal or city author-
ities. Contrary to what counsel states in his brief, page 
20, ("it ("Airways") had no franchise from Salt Lake 
City to conduct that portion of its operation which was 
conducted within Salt Lake City,") the court states: 
"The evidence showed that Airways had a 
franchise in Salt Lal\:e CitY where it had some 
local intracity routes; that it had consent and 
permission of l\Iurray City ... and it had made 
arrange1nents for all necessary franchises in all 
towns where it proposed to operate." 
There was no evidence or contention that Airways was 
going to operate an intraeity systen1 in any of the com-
rnunities named. As to S.alt Lake City it already had 
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such a franchise. It was seeking a certificate to 
operate an intercity line, from 9 communities to Salt 
Lake City, something wholly different from an intra-
city mass transportation system over designated streets, 
or fixed routes and termini, taking on passengers any-
where it desired along such routes. 
vVhile the court uses language, as quoted in plain-
tiff's brief, which seems to limit the city's power to re-
quire franchises, we earnestly submit that such language 
is not only not decisive of the question here involved; but 
as to such question, if it has any applicability at all, is 
wholly dictum. 'The essence of the court's decision w,as 
that "there is no power granted to require or grant a 
franchise for the use of the streets and highways for 
the purpose of travel thereon as used by the public 
generally ... it (Airways) uses the streets only for the 
purpose of travel and transport in the s,ame manner as 
the public generally. It is a business not subject to fran-
chise requirements." 
With such conclusion we do not disagree. In bringing 
its passengers into Salt Lake City, Airways would be 
operating the same as a farmer or tradesman in bringing 
his products or goods into the city. The streets would 
not be a part of its capital or its pl,ace of bu.siness, as 
is the case with plaintiff. 
The essence and real effect of the decision in this 
case is stated in Union Pacific R. Co. vs. Public Service 
Commission, supra, as follows: 
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"In Utah Light & Traction Co. vs. Public 
Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P. 2d 683, 
689, we defined the term 'franchise' 'as • * • the 
privilege of doing that which does not belong to 
the citizens generally by a common right'; and 
we pointed out that the right to lay rail is a 
special privilege within the purview of that defi-
nition and therefore a proper subject of grant 
by franchise. We added that franchis~ ,. • • are 
required only in cases in which it is sought to 
impose upon the street a special burden which 
cannot be imposed generally, that is, to burden 
the street with a special privilege which the public 
generally may not likewise enjoy.' We concluded, 
that since the application in that case was by 
an automobile corporation for the operation 
through certain cities as a common carrier by 
automobile, and since automobiles do not burden 
cities with rails or otherwise in a special manner, 
but only in the same manner as the public gen-
erally, that the applicant was not subject to fran-
chise requirements. In other word.s, cities and 
towns have the power conferred upon them to 
grant franchises for the use of their streets where 
such use necessitates the burdening of the street 
for the duration of the franchise with some phy-
sical instru1nentalitv such as railwaY tracks or 
trolley poles, as distinguisl1ed froni a general 
power to control the use of their streets where 
such use is merely such as is enjoyed by the pub-
lic in comn1on. Certainly, in the case last cited, 
this court recognized the power of citie.s to grant 
franchises, within the scope of the definition of 
that term therein contained, and did not regard 
that power as repealed by the Public {Ttilities Act, 
or otherwise." 
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That streets can be burdened by a special use, not 
open to the public generally, without putting some kind 
of a structure on them, such as poles, wires, rails, etc., 
is abundantly clear from the authorities heretofore cited. 
It is .also clear, from the language of these two Utah 
cases, that where the use of the streets is special the 
city has the right to require a franchise. 
In Shortino vs. Salt Lake and U. R. Co. 174 P. 
860, 52 Ut. 476, it was contended that the town of Salem 
did not have power by ordinance to fix a speed limit 
governing cars of .an interurban railroad. Article 12, 
Section 8 of the Utah Constitution is quoted as follows: 
"No law shall be passed granting the right 
to construct and operate a street railroad, tele-
graph, telephone or electric light plant within any 
city or incorporated town, without the consent of 
the local authoritie.s who have control of the street 
or highway proposed to be occupied for such 
purposes." 
The court says : 
"If it were held, however, that the foregoing 
provision did not apply to defendant's interurban 
railroad, yet the authorities of the town of Salem 
clearly had the right to grant or withhold the 
right to the use of the streets in the town, and 
thus to impose conditions respecting the use 
thereof for purpose.s other than the right of or-
dinary travel thereon." 
In the case of Lewis vs. Utah State Tax Commission, 
218 P. 2d 1074, 118 Ut. 72, this court had occasion to 
review the cases in which the term "street railway" or 
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"street railroad" was involved. It was there pointed 
out that this term may have a different connotation in 
various statutes, depending on the purpose to be ae-
complished. It is there pointed out that a street railway 
may be considered as not only a rail bound system but 
also a non rail bound street transportation system, and 
so those words could be descriptive of a street transpor-
tation system without rails. 
We contend that the provisions of the constitution 
quoted in the Shortino case, supra, should be so con-
strued as to include under the term street railroad, any 
mass transportation system which performs the same 
function as a street railroad and uses the streets for that 
purpo.se. That provision was drawn when motor buses 
were unknown. The framers used the term then appli-
cable to a mass street transportation system. It is in-
conceivable that they intended that consent of the city 
should be obtained if the streets are to be used by one 
kind of system but would not be required if some other 
system should con1e into use to replace the then known 
system. 
The case of Peoples Transit Co. rs. Louisville Ry. 
Co. 295 S.,V. 1055, 220 I~y. 728, discusse.s this very ques-
tion. Here the street railway c01npany sought to enjoin 
a bus line from operating on the city streets of Louis-
ville without -a franchise. One of the constitutional pro-
visions involved was sin1ilar to ours, u.sing the words 
"street railway." The court argued that such words 
should be interpreted in the light of the seiTires rendered, 
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rather than upon the type of means used to render the 
same, and so should be interpreted to mean a motor 
bus type of transportation system. It was not necess'ary 
to decide the case on that point, however, as the court 
held that the "use of motor vehicles on public streets 
and highways for the transportation of passengers be-
tween fixed termini, etc., is the exercise of a franchise, 
there can be no doubt." It defines .a franchise as "a 
privilege of doing that which does not belong to the 
citizen of the country by common right.'' The court then 
says: 
"Cases from the highest courts of 23 states 
besides Kentucky are cited in briefs, wherein it 
was held that one engaged in the operation of 
the busine.ss of a common carrier upon the public 
highways by motor power and between fixed ter-
mini was exercising an extraordinary privilege 
in the use of the traversed highways amounting 
to a franchise, and in our opinion in the Harrison 
Case, supra, will be found others by the Supreme 
Court of the United States to the same effect. 
There is, therefore, no room for the contention 
that defendant, while engaged in the operation 
of its bu.sses over the streets of Louisville in the 
manner hereinbefore pointed out was not doing 
so in the exercise of such a franchise as was and 
is contemplated by Section 164, supra, of our 
constitution." 
We submit that, under the power to regulate the use 
of its streets, and under its power to license and tax 
any business for revenue purposes, the City has the 
right to require that plaintiff, in operating its mass 
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transportation system over the city street.s, obtain its 
consent in the form of the franchise here involved, and 
to impose a charge of 2% of plaintiff's gross revenue 
in lieu of all taxes, levies and license taxes which might 
otherwise be imposed, such charge being limited to the 
gross revenue derived by plaintiff within the limits of 
Salt Lake City. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1944 plaintiff sought for and obtained a fran-
chise from Salt Lake City to operate a mass transpor-
tation system for carrying passengers over the street.s 
of the city, by taking over the franchise then existing 
in favor of the Utah Light and Traction Company. 
Under that franchise it could operate either electric street 
cars, electric trolley coaches or motor buses. Under the 
franchise of February 27, 1951, the one under attack, 
it still can operate the same kind of system. Since 1947, 
a period of nine (9) years, plaintiff has fully recognized 
and has acquiesed in, the city's power to grant a fran-
chise to operate a n1otor bus transportation system over 
its streets by complying with the tenns of both fran-
chise.s. It agreed orally to increasing the charge to 2% 
of it gross revenue as contained in the ordinance and 
it has sought an increase in f·ares on the basis of such 
charge. T t ha.s aerepted ti1e benefits of both franchises. 
It cannot now question the validity of either. Plaintiff 
is in a class by itself such as pennits placing conditions 
upon it not imposed upon other users of ti1e streets. 
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The franchise charge is some compensation to the public 
for the extraordinary use which plaintiff makes of the 
public streets in conducting its business thereon. Plain-
tiff is thereby assisting, to some extent at least, in 
the public burden of maintaining the streets. We re-
spectfully submit that the franchise ordinance is valid 
and that the city has the power to require payment to it 
of the 2% gross revenue which plaintiff agreed to pay. 
Judgment of the lower court should he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
Assistant City Attorney 
414 City & County Building 
Salt ·Lake City, Utah 
.Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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